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 TESTING, CONTESTING AND LEGITIMIZING TECHNOLOGY 
DIFFUSION IN REGULATED ENVIRONMENTS1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Based on a longitudinal case study approach, this paper shows that the legitimation processes 
of technology diffusion in regulated environments is subjected to distinct power struggles 
manifested in different framing contests when several competing technological frames are 
crafted, are contradictory and attempt at capturing the same resources. We show that 
technology framing contests increase ambiguity which may in turn spark the need to rely on 
technology testing in order to bring a resolution of the debate, to lower ambiguity and to 
provide legitimacy to the purpose and benefits of a technology. Furthermore, we show that 
when framing contests over diffusion cannot be resolved through legitimated means, 
institution testing may come into play. This is likely to occur when the cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy of a technology has acquired sufficient force to trump regulatory legitimacy. 
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Institutional testing, framing contest, legitimacy, technology, Boltanski and Thévenot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We know that technologies can attain a taken-for-granted status (Suchman, 1995) and be 
accepted uncritically (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991), but how does their 
diffusion become legitimate within particular organizational fields, particularly those that are 
highly regulated? As many authors have indicated, technology adoption and substitution is not 
simply a market process in which autonomous buyers evaluate alternate offerings and select 
those they prefer, but also an institutionally embedded process in which legitimacy plays a 
key role, and where multiple values or logics intersect. For example, Maguire (2004) shows 
how the penetration and substitution of the insecticide DDT was shaped by four different 
kinds of discourses: a commercial discourse surrounding a product as an efficient solution to a 
problem, a scientific discourse oriented around knowledge about the product and its effects, a 
public opinion discourse concerning how the product should be judged, and a policy discourse 
around the rules and regulations that should apply to it. As these various discourses evolved, 
the legitimacy of the product shifted dramatically along with patterns of diffusion. Similarly, 
in their history of the construction of value in the biotechnology sector, Kaplan and Murray 
(2010) note how industry participants had to simultaneously embed their new firms in 
different domains of value ranging from technical concerns (will the technology work?), 
appropriability concerns (legal rights of ownership), market concerns (will people buy the 
technology?) and ethical concerns (e.g., about safety).  
In this paper, we consider the processes by which the diffusion of a new technology, the PET 
scanner, was legitimated as it developed within one institutional field of consumption: the 
Quebec health care system. An institutional field of consumption is a community of 
organizations sharing a common meaning system and consuming or intending to consume 
similar goods and services. In contrast to much of the literature on the interaction between 
institutions and technology that focuses on producers of technology (Hargadon & Douglas, 
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2001; Munir & Phillips, 2005), we focus principally on the dynamics between users and 
institutional actors (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). We trace the pattern of diffusion of a 
technology that was initially seen as experimental, but that acquired over time increasing 
legitimacy to become widely diffused despite its high cost and despite governmental efforts to 
control it. Although a large body of research has examined patterns of technology diffusion in 
general (Greenhalgh, Robert, Bate, Macfarlane, & Kyriakidou, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Valente 
& Rogers, 1995), little work has focused on the processes by which diffusion comes to be 
legitimated in a regulated field. 
Studying how users get involved in legitimating technology diffusion is important for several 
reasons. First, the legitimacy of technology diffusion is often an important issue when it 
comes to technology bearing high risks or costs for society. For example, the distribution and 
locations of nuclear plants in Germany (Flegel, 2010) or charcoal-based electricity plants in 
China is often prone to negotiation between potential users, producers and authorities. 
Another example comes from the diesel filter for diesel cars in Germany where users were 
asking for diesel cars having a certain size to be equipped with a filter (Guérard, Gustafsson, 
& Bode, 2011). Because the diffusion of these technologies are likely to entail significant 
risks and costs for the society, they are often regulated by authorities and promoters of these 
technology have to legitimize the way these technologies should be used and be diffused. 
Second, the literature has a clear tendency to look at the legitimacy of the technology itself 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and has neglected to investigate how diffusion can also be 
prone to legitimacy processes. Instead of understanding diffusion as a proxy for legitimacy, 
we concur with Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) on the need to see diffusion and legitimacy as 
two distinct concepts where diffusion patterns need to be legitimated. 
The study of diffusion in regulated contexts also has some interesting specificities. Regulated 
contexts place would-be adopters in the position of needing to justify technology diffusion to 
  
3 
 
a key audience (the regulator). This suggests an emphasis on discursive processes, and leads 
us to consider the relevance of a “framing” perspective (Benford & Snow, 2000; Dowell, 
Swaminathan, & Wade, 2002; Kaplan, 2008) in which actors articulate and promote their 
conceptions of technology in terms of its purpose, the benefits it may or may not deliver, and 
how it should or should not be used. Although the idea of the “technology frame” developed 
by Orlikowski and Gash (1994) was originally presented as a purely socio-cognitive concept 
(see also Garud & Rappa, 1994) drawing on the idea that different groups would develop 
different meanings for technology based on their histories and contexts, in the social 
movements literature (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986), 
the notion of “frame” has a more strategic and political connotation. In a study of technology 
framing within strategy making in a single firm, Kaplan (2008) bridges socio-cognitive and 
political conceptions by viewing frames as both cognitively embedded, but also to some 
degree, consciously manipulated. She shows both how individuals attempt to bolster the 
legitimacy of their own frames and undermine those of others (in “framing contests”), and 
also how they are willing to adjust frames to achieve resonance with others (“frame 
alignment”) in order to establish a dominant frame that enables them to pursue their interests. 
A framing perspective thus seems very relevant to the issues examined here. 
Although researchers have investigated the conditions under which institutional entrepreneurs 
legitimate technology (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Munir & Phillips, 2005) and how 
organizations develop and manipulate technological frames (Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), the question of how the legitimacy of technology diffusion 
emerges in relation to patterns of framing has not been empirically explored. This paper 
contributes to an understanding of how the diffusion of technology is legitimated by 
combining insights from framing perspectives with notions from conventionalist and 
institutional theories. In particular, we show how attempts to promote diffusion of the 
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technology lead to power struggles which manifest in “framing contests” (Kaplan, 2008), 
which give rise to ambiguity that tends to slow diffusion. We show how this also stimulates 
the use of evaluation routines (Garud & Rappa, 1994) or “tests” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; 
Constant, 1987) that ultimately lead to reductions in ambiguity and offer a route towards 
legitimation. In our study, we find that “tests” may be of two different kinds: associated with 
the technology itself, what we call technology testing, or with the rules that govern its 
diffusion, what we call institutional testing. Also, this study connects constructs that are not 
explicitly linked in the literature, in particular framing contests (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Kaplan, 2008), testing (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Kaplan & Murray, 2010) and legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995).  
We begin the paper by reviewing the framing, the institutional and the conventionalist 
perspectives on legitimacy in technology diffusion, identifying the key theoretical elements 
that will be mobilized within our study, before presenting the empirical context and methods. 
We then describe the findings and consider how they contribute to better understanding the 
process of legitimation of technology diffusion in general within regulated contexts.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Framing Perspective 
As originally defined, frames are schemata of interpretation (Goffman, 1974) or socio-
cognitive structures that orient people in the way they make sense of the world, events, 
organizations or artifacts. Frames are powerful guiding structures that influence people’s 
behavior (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) and are shared by members 
of a field through the development of common beliefs, knowledge, meaning and norms 
(Porac, Ventresca, & Mishina, 2005). To our knowledge, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) were 
the first to apply this concept to the interpretation of technology. They define a technological 
frame as “the core set of assumptions, expectations, and knowledge of technology collectively 
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held by a group or community” (p. 199). By studying the adoption of Notes technology in one 
organization, they found that due to differences in their assumptions and expectations, 
knowledge users and technologists developed different technological frames to interpret 
technology. 
This socio-cognitive conception was complemented by authors adopting a social movements 
perspective who take a more political stance on framing as they define it as the strategic and 
political attempt to change influence cognitive structures (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; 
Snow et al., 1986). When several actors act strategically and politically in order to elaborate 
and push for technological frames that are aligned with their interests (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Pinch & Bijker, 1987), this may give rise to framing contests 
i.e. a battle over the meaning of an artefact. While most authors adopted either a socio-
cognitive or a political perspective on frames, Kaplan (2008) bridges both approaches by 
conceptualizing technological frames as both institutionally embedded, but also as 
strategically and intentionally manipulated. She shows how people attempt to undermine the 
frames of others while promoting their own frames and how frame alignment increases 
resonance with recipients of technological frames.  
Most previous studies have looked at the technological frames and framing contests 
elaborated by technology producers and have documented how these processes may lead to 
dominance (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008) or development of a standard (Garud, Jain, & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002) in a given technological field.  In contrast, our study focuses on 
technology users in a regulated environment. A perspective on how potential users 
strategically elaborate technological frames and engage in framing contests in order to 
influence the legitimacy of technology diffusion still needs to be explored. One key process 
that we suggest is implicated in achieving legitimacy in technology diffusion is “testing”, a 
notion grounded in the conventionalist literature. 
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Borrowing from the Conventionalist and the Institutional Perspectives 
Conventionalist theory (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) has an interest in understanding how 
disputes or framing contests can be resolved through testing. For Boltanski and Thévenot 
(2006), technological artifacts and people are ordered on a scale of value, called state of worth. 
People or artifacts which are more aligned or resonate more with the higher common principle 
would be considered as being more worthy. However, the state of worth can be questioned or 
challenged when an injustice or disharmony arises and engenders a dispute. In this situation, a 
test can be performed to establish or not the legitimacy or state or worth of a technology or an 
individual as it can provide a proof. The performance of technological artifacts or people 
undergoing the test is likely to re-order their state of worth. Should they fail the test, their 
state of worth would be re-ordered to a lower position, while a success would either maintain 
or enhance their position.  
Such a test must be consistent with the higher common principle, closely related to what 
institutionalists label institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), and be perceived as a 
relevant proof of the materialization of this principle. Therefore, “a test of worth cannot be 
reduced to a theoretical debate. It engages persons, in their bodily existence, in a world of 
things that serve as evidence, and in the absence of which the dispute does not have the 
material means for resolution” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006: 131).  
Some authors have suggested that testing is important (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Kaplan & 
Murray, 2010) in legitimizing technology. Because the benefits and risks associated with an 
emerging technology are unknown, actors draw on evaluation routines to define what the 
technology is (Constant, 1987; Garud & Rappa, 1994). Garud and Rappa (1994) are among 
the few scholars who explicitly attempt to understand how evaluation routines developed by 
researchers may provide legitimacy if the technology performs according to their expectations 
and beliefs. This concept is close to the notion of test as the technology is assessed according 
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to a shared point of reference and which materializes in measurement tools to assess the 
performance of an artefact. In the same vein, Kaplan and Murray (2010) found that to 
influence the evolution of the field of biotechnology, entrepreneurs developed evidence and 
developed tests that fit their evidence. While the work of Constant (1987) and Garud and 
Rappa (1994) explicitly relate testing to the measurement of the performance of an artefact, 
the work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) extends the notion of testing to other intangible 
objects such as norms, culture or social order. All these authors consider that testing is a key 
social phenomenon which legitimizes or delegitimizes the position of technological artefacts 
or actors in a given field, depending on their performance during a test.  
Finally, we borrow the concept of legitimacy from the institutional perspective. Building on 
Suchman’s (1995: 574) classical definition of legitimacy, the legitimacy of technology 
diffusion can be defined as the “generalized perception or assumption” that the way a 
technology intends to be or is actually diffused is “desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Legitimacy can 
take different forms. Based on his three classical institutional pillars, Scott (2008) proposes 
three types. Regulative legitimacy is conferred to actors who comply with the law or who 
shape the law to make them appear in conformance with it. Normative or moral legitimacy is 
related to the conformity to professional norms or standards, and cultural-cognitive legitimacy 
refers to entities that attain a taken-for-granted status and are uncritically accepted. As long as 
there is an alignment between an entity and one of these types of legitimacy, an entity may be 
deemed legitimate. Typologies of legitimacy have been mobilized in several studies and have 
mainly addressed the strategies organizations use in order to gain legitimacy (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Vaara, Kleymann, & Seristö, 2004), to understand the 
motivations of organizations to adopt innovations (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983) or to justify new organizational or industrial arrangements (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; 
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Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006). However, there is a fairly limited number 
of studies mobilizing the neo-institutional lens which explicitly looked at how organizations 
struggle to legitimize artifacts or technology (Aldrich, 1999), and even less on legitimizing 
technology diffusion. 
Overall, the studies from these perspectives highlight different dimensions of the legitimation 
of technology. The framing perspective insists on the socio-cognitive and political aspects of 
meaning creation related to technology, the conventionalist perspective is sensitive to the 
question of testing to put an end to disagreements or disputes in social life and the 
institutional perspective has extensively conceptualized legitimacy. We show in this paper 
how a combination of these perspectives can help illuminate the process of legitimation of 
technology diffusion.  
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Context 
The PET scanner is a particularly interesting technology to study technology framing activity 
and framing contests because it is complex, expensive, and was initially at least, quite 
controversial, as the purpose of the technology was not clear. However, the high quality of the 
images which the scanner could produce created excitement in the medical community while 
engaging health care regulators in efforts to limit its diffusion in health care systems due to its 
high costs (acquisition costs of 2 million USD and annual running costs of 1.5 million USD). 
Nowadays, the PET scanner is a complex imaging technology for diagnosing cancer, cardiac 
and neurological diseases. Currently, experts claim that about one PET scanner per million of 
population is sufficient for clinical and research purposes (Cleemput, Camberlin, Van den 
Bruel, & Ramaekers, 2008).  
Highly regulated environments are particularly interesting to study the legitimation processes 
of technology diffusion because users must legitimate to their audience, in this case the 
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regulator, where and why the technology should be diffused. Thus, this case was valuable to 
study because it was likely to unravel processes which could be difficult to observe in other 
contexts. The highly regulated institutional field which we selected for studying the diffusion 
of the PET scanner is the Quebec2 health care system which is publicly run and highly 
centralized. This field constitutes a field of consumption because the case is characterized 
with hospitals and private clinics which attempt to convince the Government of providing 
funding for the diffusion of the PET scanner and of influencing the way the PET scanner 
should be diffused. The Ministry of Health funds the system from tax revenues and negotiates 
global budgets with hospitals. It is particularly regulated when it comes to expensive 
technologies such as the PET scanner as the Ministry of Health must authorize hospitals to 
acquire the technology. A Health Technology Assessment Agency makes recommendations 
concerning which technologies should be reimbursed by the State.  
The diffusion of the PET scanner in this institutional field of consumption occurred in three 
regions labeled A, B and C. It involved four independent teaching hospitals3 (TH) that we 
named THA1, THA2, THB, and THC; two of them are part of the same region. Other 
hospitals like the general hospital GHC of region C were involved in the legitimation process 
of the diffusion of the PET scanner. Overall, 11 scanners were adopted before 2008.  
Data Collection and Data Analysis  
The research involved a retrospective case study design with embedded units of analysis (Yin, 
2003), where the legitimation process prior to and during adoption of the first PET scanners 
 
 
2 One of the biggest provinces of Canada. 
3 At the time of the study, the teaching hospitals were not part of a network like it is now the 
case. 
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was studied. A case study research approach is suitable for at least two reasons. Firstly, it 
allows for theory elaboration (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999) by showing how existing 
unconnected variables in the literature are related in certain situations which the case study 
describes. Second, the case study approach enables us to capture in detail how processes 
unfold over time (Langley, 1999). 
Data on the legitimation process of technology diffusion were collected from two sources: 
interviews and documents. First, organizations having adopted the PET scanner during the 
study and those who engaged in battles to obtain it (sometimes unsuccessfully) were 
interviewed. Overall, 42 semi-structured interviews were carried out at all levels: national, 
regional and at sites which intended to obtain a PET scanner. Of these interviews, 33 lasted 
between 40 to 110 minutes, and 9 between 20 to 40 minutes. Respondents were selected 
according to their centrality in the process. To perform these interviews an interview guide 
was crafted to capture the characteristics of the diffusion of the PET scanner in this 
institutional field. Interviews began by asking the respondents to tell the story of the adoption 
process of the PET scanner in which they were involved. They were then asked to explain 
what the technology meant to them, what were the arguments in favor and against the 
technology, and what legitimation strategies were mobilized by all actors involved in the 
diffusion and adoption of this technology across the province of Quebec.  
Second, internal and external documents were collected and analyzed to establish process 
chronologies, to examine written technological frames, to identify major field frames inherent 
to the system, and for triangulation purposes with other sources of data (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). Overall, 87 documents including extensive reports 
produced by hospitals and the government as well as press released were collected for 
analysis.   
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To break down the complexity of the data into manageable pieces and to allow meanings and 
specific mechanisms to emerge (Langley, 1999), we elaborated a detailed narrative through 
iterations between data collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). The narrative was 
reviewed by two informants to check validity. These narratives showed that there were 
intense struggles over the meaning of the technology and its diffusion.  
We then examined in more detail the discourses actors put forward to describe and justify the 
value of the technology and the way in which it should be adopted, in other words, their 
framing of it. These discourses could be grouped into three main dimensions which are: 1) the 
purpose of the technology i.e. what is the technology for; 2) the benefits of the technology i.e. 
why adopt the technology; and 3) how the technology should be diffused at the regional, 
national levels and local levels, i.e. how it should be diffused and who should adopt it. Table 1 
shows how we coded our material according to these dimensions. 
The coded dimensions correspond closely to the dimensions of technological frames 
documented by Gash and Orlikowski (1994) as well as to other authors’ representations of 
framing discourse (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Kaplan, 2008; 
Markowitz, 2007; McAdam et al., 1996). We evaluated the reliability of our coding by asking 
a trained research assistant to recode a sample of 27 relevant segments (14% of our sample), 
into the major themes technological frames. We obtained inter-rater agreements of 87%. The 
main arguments used by each party involved in the struggles over the diffusion of the PET 
scanner in the Quebec health care system are displayed in the text by using matrix displays 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). The use of matrix displays facilitated a comparative analysis 
between sites.  
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TABLE 1:  
DIMENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMES (195 SEGMENTS) 
What is the purpose of the technology? (39 data segments) 
Frames about the purpose of the technology focused around two elements:  
a) Clinical tool: uses of technology for oncology, cardiology or neurology.  
b) Research or clinical tool: whether the technology is a research tool or a clinical tool
 
Why was this technology adopted i.e. what are the benefits/risks? (40 data segments) 
Frames supporting the adoption took many different forms, classified into 4 categories: 
a) Effectiveness: discussion of the superiority of the technology for health outcomes. 
b) Epidemiological need: discussion of numbers of patients needing the technology  
c) Good value for money: positive arguments about efficiency and cost-benefit ratio 
d) Standard technology: statements that the necessity of the technology is now taken for 
granted 
 
How to diffuse the technology or who should adopt the technology? (116 data segments) 
Technological Frames around the diffusion of the technology contained two conflicting 
perspectives supported by a rationale of quality and a rational of access. 
a) Concentration: arguments for restricting the diffusion of the technology to fewer 
centers to (i) enable use of most advanced technology; (ii) ensure adequate expertise 
in key centers; or (iii) to restrict diffusion and use (and cost). The first two rationales 
are associated with a frame of quality and the second to a frame of efficiency. 
b) Dispersion: arguments for widening the diffusion of the technology to more centers 
to ensure availability in the regions for people all around Quebec to have access. 
c) Equity of access: The technology should be adopted here to ensure fair geographic 
proximity and access for professionals. 
d) Good value for money: The technology should be adopted here because it will be 
cheapest this way, we can make better use of it, low investment is required, etc. This 
corresponds to a frame of efficiency. 
e) Local epidemiological need: The technology should be adopted here because of the 
needs of the local population. This is related to a frame of access. 
f) Mission aligned with the technology: The technology should be adopted here because 
we have the appropriate expertise, capacity, infrastructure, network, and mission 
alignment (associated with a variety of frames depending on the purpose and benefits 
of the technology).
 
 
 
FINDINGS 
This section describes the theoretical model that emerged from our data and that is displayed 
in Figure 1. As will be described in the following, our findings suggest that testing is a key 
concept explaining how framing contests may be resolved and how they may lead to the 
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legitimacy of technology diffusion. We now present the case narrative and analysis building 
up to the model.  
FIGURE 1: 
LEGITIMACY OF THE TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: A THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The Case Study 
The case study is constituted of two phases. In the first phase, we see technology framing 
contests that essentially raise questions about the value of the technology itself – leading to 
the first form of testing i.e. technology testing. In the second phase, technology framing 
contests are more related to the way the technology should be diffused. This leads to a second 
form a testing i.e. institution testing. 
Phase 1: Technology Framing Contests over the Purpose and the Benefits of the 
Technology 
Region B. The adoption of the first PET scanner that would eventually perform clinical 
applications occurred at teaching hospital THB and resulted from the entrepreneurship of a 
nuclear doctor who relentlessly fought to persuade the Quebec Ministry of Health to invest in 
the creation of a research center, which would include a PET scanner and a cyclotron for 
research applications in oncology. While in 1995 the main purpose of the PET scanner was 
still to perform research, the first clinical application of PET scanner procedures were 
financed through research funds and through a special budget supplied by the teaching 
hospital in 1998. The first use of the PET scanner in a clinical setting aroused consternation 
among nuclear doctors around the province, especially from those practicing in major 
teaching hospitals in the bigger regions A and C, and it prompted those hospitals to press for a 
Legitimacy 
of
Technology 
Diffusion
Testing
1. Technological
2. Institutional
Technology 
Framing 
Contests
Reduction of 
ambiguity
Ambiguity
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PET scanner for themselves. No one actually understood why a PET scanner was installed in 
a relatively small and remote area. Irrationality and political games were invoked to explain 
this unexpected situation. In addition to this, the decision of the US Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services to authorize the reimbursement of the PET scanner for lung cancer as well 
as the wide and fast diffusion of this technology in USA contributed to build up pressure on 
the Ministry of Health to diffuse this technology on a wider scale. In July 2001, the remote 
teaching hospital THB surprisingly acquired a second PET scanner, officially for research 
purposes. Meanwhile, although hospitals in the region A were surprised, most of them were 
caught in political tensions due to the merger of teaching hospitals. Hence, many technology 
initiatives were dropped temporarily in favour of other important issues related to these 
mergers.  
Region C. While the acquisition of the PET scanner by the teaching hospital THB 
encountered no competition or resistance, either locally or nationally, competition in region C 
between the general hospital GHC, a specialized hospital in cardiology and in lung cancer, 
and THC, the most important teaching hospital in the area, seriously impeded any attempt at 
adoption. As early as 1988, both hospitals were already striving to persuade the Ministry of 
Health to acquire a PET scanner for clinical purposes as well as for research, but the 
technology was not sufficiently mature from a clinical point of view to convince the authority 
and for hospitals to continue struggling for this cause.  
In 1995, cumulating scientific evidence for the use of the PET scanner in lung cancer revived 
the interest of both hospitals in obtaining this technology, and in 1997-1998 each hospital 
submitted a report to the Health Services Regional Agency. In 2001, both hospitals sent an 
up-dated version of these reports to the same agency: 
“Medical  literature reported awesome clinical results when using PET scans for, among 
others,  lung  cancer.  This  was  the  first  kind  of  cancer  where  their  efficacy  was 
documented.  (…) This produced a renewed  interest  for PET scans around 1994‐1995.  It 
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became  known,  in  oncology  circles,  that  using  the  procedure  could  yield  significant 
information on lung cancer diagnosis. This led us to produce a brand new report on this 
topic in 1997.” 
These reports developed different technological frames on the purpose of the technology and 
on its benefits. In addition, they explained how the technology should be locally implemented. 
However, the meanings they attempted to impose on the technology were different. In this 
case, both hospitals were in competition and developed technological frames in such a way 
that their own sites would be perceived by the authorities to be most appropriate for a PET 
scanner. 
Specifically, because of its dual mission in cardiology and in lung cancer, hospital GHC 
declared itself to be the best centre to receive a PET scanner. It contended that its supra-
regional mission combined with the fact that it performed the highest number of cardiac 
surgical operations justified obtaining a PET scanner. Since the evidence on the potential in 
the case of lung cancer was indisputable, hospital GHC also emphasized the fact that they 
were performing the highest number of surgeries in pulmonary cancer. On the other hand, 
teaching hospital THC argued that oncology was the main application of PET scanner. Given 
that more than half of the clinical activities in oncology in the region C were performed at 
THC, it argued that it should be the first centre to adopt a PET scanner. Also, since the 
cyclotron was essential to the production of radiopharmaceuticals, its location also became an 
issue.  
Because the half-life of the radiopharmaceutical used in cardiology is approximately 2 
minutes, hospital GHC argued that the cyclotron should be close to their building. 
Emphasizing its mission in research and in evaluating new technology, THC argued that the 
cyclotron should be in their organization. These self-interested arguments and destructive 
battles did not accelerate the diffusion of the technology given that the government was 
trapped, not knowing who should obtain the technology. Moreover, important financial 
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constraints such as a high deficit did not allow the government to provide both hospitals with 
this technology:  
“Confronted with this tug‐of‐war, how did the Managers of the Health Services Regional 
Agency react? They took no decisions. They did nothing. They did not know what to do. 
And don’t forget that, for them, cost  is the most  important consideration. They did not 
mind investing nothing, especially in a context where hospitals are still in deficit.” 
Hence, confronted with these struggles, the Ministry of Health had no choice but to avoid 
announcing an investment that might turn out to be in its disfavour: “Even in ‘C’ region, there 
were debates between THC and the GHC. They told us: ‘Settle your own problems. The 
minister won’t get the news out, only to be fired upon by one of the two hospitals.’” Table 2 
summarizes the technological frames mobilized by actors at this point. 
Given that the regulator is the only actor who can actually authorize and provide the funding 
for such an expensive acquisition, it was really reluctant to allow one of these hospitals to 
obtain the PET scanner. Two reasons motivated the regulator not to move forward. First, 
facing divergent and self-interested technological frames about the purpose and the benefits of 
the PET scanner which were based on different bodies of the scientific literature, the regulator 
did not know how to handle this ambiguity: “Faced with these battles, what do the 
government administrators do? They don’t make a decision. They don’t really know.” Second, 
the extraordinary cost of the PET scanner was a powerful impediment to the legitimacy of this 
technology.  
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TABLE 2: 
TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMES DEVELOPED BY HOSPITAL THC AND GHC IN QUEBEC 
Technological 
Frames  Hospital THC  Hospital GHC 
Purposes  PET as a research tool 
PET as a clinical tool for oncology 
"Clinical indications for the PET technology are by order of importance, 
oncology (over 18 pathologies for which indications are recognized), 
neurology (2 indications), and cardiology (1 indication)." [This 
argument is supported in the report by one article containing a 
systematic review of evidence supporting PET for oncology.] 
 
“The PET scanner is a functional imaging modality with a huge 
potential, as it has generated a voluminous literature. It has three main 
applications which are: oncology, for the majority of recognized 
applications; and neurology and cardiology which have fewer 
applications. In oncology, the PET scanner is effective for the 
diagnostic, the staging, the assessment of treatment effectiveness and 
the re-staging; it’s a crucial modality for frequent and deadly diseases.”  
 PET as a clinical tool for cardiology and lung cancer 
"The two areas where clinical use and potential are best developed and recognized are 
precisely for heart disease and lung cancer." [This argument is supported in the report 
by reference to 51 studies, 42 of which provide evidence for cardiac applications]. 
 
“Lung cancer is the most important and the best documented indication for the PET 
scanner in oncology. The lung cancer constitutes by itself at least 50% of the total 
number of PET scanners in oncology.”  
Benefits  PET has several clinical advantages 
"Early evaluation of the effectiveness of anticancer therapeutic 
interventions" 
“The PET scanner can significantly reduce useless surgeries and 
services.”  
“In oncology, the PET has a major role to play as it allows to better 
orient the chemotherapy; what no other conventional imaging modality 
[CT scans or MRI] can do.” 
 “A routine assess using PET scans may avoid around 20,000 non-
indicated laparotomies and 4,400 resections on patients with a weak 
prognostic.” 
 PET scanner is effective 
"Several studies confirmed the high diagnostic performance of the PET scanner for 
the detection of heart disease." 
 
"The PET scanner has emerged as an important diagnostic tool in the treatment of 
lung cancer." 
 
“The PET scanner is a powerful diagnostic instrument in cardiology and has an 
important potential for clinical and research applications. Despite its high costs, which 
is in part due to the necessity to have a cyclotron on the spot to produce short life 
isotopes, the great diagnostic precision of this technique and the exclusive character of 
the diagnostic information collected can make the technique cost-effective for some 
applications such as the identification of the myocardial viability and the early 
identification of coronary disease.” 
 
“The main objective of a new technology in the diagnostic of a lung nodule mainly 
consists in reducing the number of invasive interventions (biopsy, thoracotomies) for 
benign lesions. The current evidence suggest that the PET scanner is a sensitive exam 
to detect malignant lesions.” 
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Who should 
adopt in the 
region? 
 Those whose missions and activities are aligned with the technology
“The assessment of technologies is part of the mission of a teaching 
hospital [like ours], that’s why new technologies, no matter which one, 
must be implemented there in priority. Teaching hospitals only, and in 
particular ours, have such a wide variety of medical and professional 
expertises to appropriately assess a new technology such as the PET 
scanner.  
 
"The strong points of the hospital were that it was a large hospital 
treating more than half of the clinical activity in oncology in the 
region." 
 
"THC wanted the machine because they are a centre for excellence and 
technology evaluation. They wanted to do research with that." 
 
Those with appropriate competence to run a cyclotron 
“The THC hospital offers a special and functional environment to install 
a regional unit of the production and detection of positrons: the circular 
accelerator (cyclotron) would work under the supervision of the most 
important team in biophysics in hospital settings in Quebec.  This team 
has a unique expertise on linear accelerators with a direct application on 
patients and an expertise to work with the cyclotron.” 
 
"At THC, there was already a physician team. We had hired two nuclear 
doctors who were trained or in training with fellowships of a least a 
year."  
 
"We already had a solid physician team to make the cyclotron work, 
and to take care of it." 
 
 Those whose missions and activities are aligned with the technology 
"GHC is a designated university institute in cardiology and pneumology where the 
highest number of heart surgeries are undertaken each year." 
 
“The GHC hospital, designated university institute of cardiology and pneumology, is 
the centre with the highest number of major cardiac surgeries per year in Quebec; and 
with the clinical expansion foreseen from January 2002, it will become the biggest 
centre in Canada. The GHC hospital is also the site where the highest number of 
surgery of the lung cancer in Canada. The clinical importance of this double mission 
in cardiology and in pneumology is naturally extended in terms of research and 
teaching activities and, as a results, make the GHC hospital a unique site in Quebec 
and in Canada” 
 
"We have the largest group of pneumology specialists in Canada." 
 
Those who need the cyclotron close to their installation 
"Our argument at GHC was that we needed the cyclotron in cardiology given the short 
half-lives of radiopharmaceuticals in this speciality" 
 
"By having it on our site, it could still be used by Hospital THC who work more in 
oncology" 
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Analysis. Somewhat paradoxically, these technological frames on the purpose and benefits of 
the technology which were both based on science and on the authorization to be reimbursed in 
USA did not contribute to helping the PET scanner gain legitimacy for all actors involved in 
the debate. At this point, cardiologists considered that the PET scanner was a legitimate 
technology to be used in cardiology and oncologists deemed the technology to be legitimated 
to treat cancer, but there was no consensus within the medical community in Quebec. The 
regulator who was more sensitive to cost-effectiveness issues did not perceive the PET 
scanner as a legitimate tool either given ambiguity which was raised from the struggles over 
meaning between both hospitals. In other words, competition expressed via struggles over 
meaning – the only legitimate means of acquiring the technology in the Quebec health care 
system – placed the regulator in a quandary and initially at least inhibited the legitimate 
diffusion of the PET scanner. 
Technology Testing 
Altogether, quarrels in region C, the first clinical use of the technology in the province of 
Quebec, the authorization to reimburse the PET scanner procedure by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services in USA, and the emerging evidence in the scientific 
literature praising the clinical benefits of the PET scanner stimulated both the president of a 
Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine and a Patients’ Association for Cancer to ask the 
Ministry of Health to produce a report on the cost-effectiveness of this technology. This 
request was addressed to the Health Technology Assessment Agency in September 2000.  
While the legitimization of the PET scanner as a clinical tool in this organizational field was 
strongly enhanced with its first clinical use and with the authorization for reimbursement by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the USA, the publication of the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency (HTAA) report in October 2001 confirmed the evidence-
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based legitimacy of the PET scanner in this organizational field as an indispensable diagnostic 
tool for specific conditions.  
The clinical conclusions of this report were unequivocal and claimed that at least 15,000 
examinations were required annually. Although the report does not proclaim any dominant 
application (cardiology, oncology, neurology), it definitively supports its legitimacy, a 
legitimacy which is related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the technology as a 
diagnostic tool. Indeed, from that moment, the legitimacy (derived from evidence) of this 
technology was associated with an intensification of hospitals asking to have a PET scanner, 
especially in the region A: “After the HTAA report, the first impact and the most visible one 
is that we received rapidly many applications [to acquire the PET scanner] from many 
[hospitals] that were all referring to this report.” 
Besides legitimating the technology in this institutional field of consumption, the HTAA 
report suggested how the PET scanner should be disseminated in the province of Quebec. The 
following quotations from interviews support our contention that from then on the technology 
was perceived as legitimate from a clinical point of view. Indeed, all the respondents point to 
a technological frame around the benefits of the technology that would eventually lead to it 
being taken for granted as an essential medical tool: 
“It's  like  asking  whether  you  need  an  operating  room  in  a  hospital.  (…)  It's  an 
indispensable and necessary tool.” 
- Nuclear doctor  
 
“It's inevitable; it's a question of the quality of medicine. Some will even say that it is bad 
medical practice not to use it in diagnosis.” 
- President of a Medical Association 
 
“After  the  Health  Technology  Assessment  Agency  report,  the  first  and  most  visible 
impact  is  that  we  rapidly  received  many  requests  from  the  hospitals  that  were  all 
referring to this report.” 
- Biomedical engineer 
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Analysis. The framing of technology in region C could not resolve issues surrounding the 
legitimacy of the technology alone as two groups of medical professionals were contradicting 
each other. The only way to build the legitimacy of the purpose and benefits of the technology 
was to rely on an independent organization, the Health Technology Assessment Agency, 
which would conduct an evaluation of the technology. Because this organization has the 
reputation to be reliable and professional and is the only formal agency in the province having 
this mission, its evaluation provided legitimacy to the PET scanner at least in terms of its 
purpose and benefits. Indeed, the report did confirm that the technology was useful for several 
applications and that a certain number of exams were required every year. The assessment of 
the technology constitutes a form of testing (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) as the technology 
“passes through” a legitimate evaluation routine, in this case scientific evaluation, to judge the 
appropriateness of a technology. We refer to this evaluation routine as technology testing and 
will deepen the analysis in the discussion section. 
Phase 2: Technology Framing Contest over the Diffusion of the Technology 
However, content of the report suggested a new dimension of technology which was not 
clearly disputed before. Indeed, the report paved the way for further struggles over the 
meaning of the technology in terms of the principles on which the technology should be 
diffused in the health care system. This led to further framing contests and another round of 
testing but of a different form as we shall see. 
While the report clearly established the legitimacy of the technology itself, the 
recommendations of the report suggesting that the PET scanner technology should be 
"progressively deployed in collaboration with teaching hospitals and university institutes" 
and "through research activities" raised several concerns among nuclear doctors. The 
recommendations were perceived by the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine as a signal 
that the PET scanner technology was going to be diffused to teaching hospitals only, given 
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their mission in research, and that the report was suggesting that more cyclotrons (an 
expensive machine mainly used in research) should be bought to produce FDG. This was 
perceived to be favouring research at the expense of clinical applications:  
 “[Some of ] the Report’s  [...] conclusions were appalling, because several actors  in this 
report  had  private  interests.  […].  I  said  :  ‘We’re  trapped’,  because  these  two  centers 
[THA1  and  THA2] wanted major  investments  to  become  great  training,  teaching  and 
research centers. But all we wanted was to develop a clinical tool […] to detect sickness 
and take the best possible clinical decisions for a patient to avoid removing half his face 
if he had tongue cancer.” 
Reacting to this report, the Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine created a special 
committee rallying nuclear doctors in remote hospitals in order to negotiate directly with the 
Government in power. By primarily defining the PET scanner as a clinical device and not a 
research tool, the aim of this special committee was to counteract the recommendations 
favouring teaching hospitals, and to democratize access to this high-end medical technology 
by proposing that 12 major centres in oncology should obtain a PET scanner, but at once and 
not progressively. This was technically possible since by the year 2002 the FDG was being 
supplied by American private companies so a nearby cyclotron was no longer necessary.  
By December 2002, after intense negotiations and after teaching hospital THA2 announced its 
intention to buy a PET scanner with or without the consent of the government, the Ministry of 
Health agreed to invest $23 millions USD to buy 12 PET scanners and to diffuse them all over 
the province. This agreement brought a short period of truce up to the election of April 2003 
which witnessed the change of the party in power and the nomination of a new director of 
hospitals at the Quebec Ministry of Health. This marked a radical shift in the informal 
agreement to diffuse the technology widely.  
Moreover, from the beginning of 2003, the debate over how the technology should be 
diffused took a new turn with the availability of the relatively new and more effective 
architecture (Henderson & Clark, 1990) of the PET-CT scanner. Because the CT scanner 
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provides quasi instantaneous anatomical images while the PET scanner provides unrivalled 
functional images, the combination of both increased the precision of the diagnosis. With the 
emergence of this alternative, two types of architecture were available on the market: PET-CT 
scanners and standalone PET scanners. 
Experts estimated that the clinical added-value of the PET-CT scanner over the standalone 
PET scanner was for approximately 15% of cases, mainly in the Oto-Rhino-Laryngology 
speciality. In addition, the PET-CT scanner allowed a hospital to perform 12 cases per day 
instead of 8 with a standalone PET scanner. This was due to the fact that the addition of the 
CT scanner reduced the time required to scan a patient. Besides allowing more patients to be 
diagnosed per day per machine, acquiring a PET-CT scanner would allow teaching hospitals 
to participate in international research protocols. Indeed, the PET-CT scanner was becoming a 
standard in research for OECD countries: “Even at the University UB, they were excluded 
from over 30 multi-centers protocols. As a result, they are becoming regional, and cannot 
longer have any impact in terms of research.” 
The parallel development of this new architecture with the publication of the Health 
Technology Assessment Agency report combined with the election of the new government 
turned the dynamic surrounding the diffusion of the technology into a confrontation between 
two clans: the Pro-stand-alone-PET clan which favored the diffusion of 12 PET scanners 
against the Pro-PET-CT coalition which wanted the technology to diffuse progressively from 
teaching hospitals to other hospitals.  
The following quotations illustrate in a revealing manner the heated debate which was taking 
place. The proponents of those who framed the PET scanner a clinical tool were in favour of 
diffusing the technology to make it accessible to the whole population were arguing that: 
"Better give everyone a good Chrysler than giving a Ferrari to 3 or 4 people, that's what we 
wanted at the Association."  
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The frames of the proponents arguing that the PET scanner should be further developed by 
research were emphasizing the important of the quality of the diagnostic produced by doctors. 
According to them, quality should be the primary principle along which the PET scanner 
should be allocated were using the following metaphor: 
« They’ll  say, « I am a Cessna pilot,  I can also pilot a 747.” People will  say  that, but  it 
makes no sense! (..) They’ll say: “It’s not complicated – I’ll put it on automatic pilot.” OK, 
but is that the function of a 747 pilot? So you’ll place your life in the hands of someone 
who doesn’t have the expertise necessary to make complex and major adjustments that 
a technology like that requires.” 
Table 4 provides further examples of quotations framing the way the technology should be 
diffused in this health care system, and summarizes the technological frames mobilized by 
each clan in this struggle. To make sure that the PET scanner would be widely available, the 
Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine invested in different lobbying actions to persuade 
the government of the necessity of diffusing the PET scanner to as many places as possible 
for people to have access to this technology. 
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TABLE 4:  
FRAMING CONTESTS FOLLOWING THE HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT IN QUEBEC 
Technological 
Frames  Stand-alone PET   PET-CT 
Purpose  PET as a proven clinical tool needed by all regardless of location 
“First, we said that this technology was mature… It was not a research 
tool. I did my internship at [name of the hospital] and there was not even 
1% of the exam which were for research purposes. It was with real 
patients, with real cancers. So, number one, it is a device which is for 
clinical purposes. They should not come to bother us with their research 
projects to say that they are doing research. This is complete bullshit.”  
 
« The application of this tool is essentially in oncology – more than 90%. 
There is a little bit in cardiology and in neurology and a bit of research. 
But the main application is 90% in oncology. So, it a clinical tool which 
should be used for patients with cancer.”  
 PET-CT as a high-performing proven clinical tool which needs to be further 
developed through research 
"The study of [HTAA] confirms that the PET scanner is clinically useful for several 
applications in oncology, neurology and cardiology. In oncology, the PET scanner 
is known for some specific applications when it comes to lung cancer, colorectal 
cancer, melanoma, head cancer, neck cancer, and lymphoma. Depending on the 
cancer type, the PET scanner contributes to look for metastasis et therapeutic 
follow-up. In neurology, the PET scanner shows a good effectiveness for some 
applications such as epilepsy and cerebral tumors. In cardiology, the usefulness of 
the PET scanner is known for some applications like the myocardial perfusion and 
myocardial viability. Finally, the PET scanner has an interesting potential in other 
applications in these domains. 
Benefits 
 
 PET scan for all to avoid child from suffering 
"Chemotherapy is hard as a treatment. That's why with the PET scanner, 
we can evaluate whether local radiotherapy or chemotherapy would be 
better and protect the child from suffering. [...] Just think if you have a 
12 year-old child who needs radiotherapy and you have to send them to 
the big city. It's torture." 
 
 
Lower travel costs with greater equity and access 
"Oncology is permanent. You have your cancer, you come back, you are 
re-evaluated. There's a lot of travelling. So the PET will allow the 
regionalization of care, keeping resources, people, and avoiding 
excessive travel costs." 
 
“The Association  favours  the dedicated PET cameras  that are  twice as 
cheap [than PET‐CT], but everyone would get one."  
 
“[With PET] we can save $15,000-$20,000 for people we operate on 
unnecessarily." 
 Better quality diagnoses per case 
"A PET scanner will locate the tumor… in the body but not in a specific way. It will 
say: it is there. But with the CT, we can take a tomographic image which will locate 
the tumor in the tissue so we can see exactly where it is." 
 
 
 
 
Lower cost per examination with higher quality 
"An ordinary PET scanner can do about six or seven patients per day. With the 
PET-CT, we can go up to 12 so we can double the volume and [lower the cost per 
examination]. " 
“So, typically, if you look today at a typical hospital they take may be 15-20 
minutes to do the attenuation correction a piece [with a standalone PET scanner] 
versus 30 seconds [with a PET-CT]. […] [Moreover], The FDG cost per patient is 
significantly less." 
     Inevitability of PET-CT 
"[In the conference] basically nobody was speaking of Stand-alone PET. Nobody. 
[...] I can’t think of a single institution that has actively gone to tender for Stand-
alone PET." 
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Diffusion 
 
 
 PET for all, coherence with prior distribution of oncology centres 
"With the government, we proposed that the 15,000 exams that were 
necessary per year in oncology, that the 12 first pieces of equipment be 
installed in the regional centres for oncology " 
 
“We told ourselves: “what about if we tried to offer the techniques along 
axes of radio-oncology?” This has the advantage to be binary. Whether 
you are a center in radiotherapy or not. There is no need for further 
arguments and it eliminates lots of fights between centers which wanted 
it. This argument could terminate the debate. Moreover, it had the virtue 
to follow axes that the government had already taken in the past.” 
  Competence has to be developed first before allowing adoption 
“We buy a Formula 1. We want to have a driver, but we train him in 15 days, and 
we send him with the other F1 drivers, and he has no team around him, etc. You 
know what you need to have a F1? You need more than one mechanic. You need a 
formidable team. And then, you say that are going to buy 12 Formula 1 and that you 
will train for in 15 days. And you will tell me that you want to compete at the F1 
level, well, you must be kidding!” 
“A progressive deployment is even more advisable considering that a PET center 
demands specialized material and human resources to function properly. At the 
present time, available human resources trained specifically for PET are insufficient 
in Quebec. They could not sustain this planned deployment. Training of specialized 
personnel should be a top priority.” (HTAA report)  
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Nonetheless, at that time, the PET-CT which was as twice expensive as the standalone PET 
scanner tended to be privileged by the government due to the international trend on the PET-
CT over the standalone PET scanner. However, this tendency was not enough for the 
government to announce that a decision had been made. Indeed, the Ministry of Health 
needed to get the support of the Pro-stand-alone-PET coalition which was still promoting a 
wider diffusion.  
Analysis. Again, these framing contests were not helpful in enabling the regulator to make 
decisions as to how the technology should be disseminated. The opposing frames have strong 
cultural-cognitive resonance in the context of the Quebec health care system i.e. equity of 
access and quality of care. However, they lead to completely opposite conclusions as to what 
is the legitimate way to allocate the technology across the health care system. The arguments 
mobilized within the framing contests did not have sufficient resonance or legitimacy to 
resolve the conflict alone. This led to another form of testing… in which it was not so much 
the legitimacy of the technology itself that was tested, but rather the legitimacy of the very 
rules underlying its diffusion. 
Institution Testing 
The First Deviant Adoption. The confrontation between the Quebec Association of Nuclear 
Medicine and teaching hospitals that followed the publication of the HTAA report as to how 
to diffuse the PET scanner was not a good omen for a quick diffusion of this technology. This 
combined with repeated informal and unanswered requests from hospitals to obtain a PET 
scanner and the fast diffusion of this technology in the USA induced disillusionment and 
cynicism in many nuclear doctors with regard to the possibility of obtaining a PET scanner: 
“The deployment of PET scanners, I've been hearing about that for four years, and another 
announcement arrives every 15th of the month. It's the classic running gag. I've stopped 
believing in that.” 
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Since it was the most advanced detecting technology for cancer, doctors and administrators of 
THA1 understood the strategic importance of the PET scanner and its alignment with their 
mission. However, being aware that no budget announcement for the deployment of the PET 
scanner would be made in the short term, Doctor Z, a nuclear doctor working at THA1, asked 
the private foundation of the hospital to buy a PET scanner.  
The stratagem consisted of renting the technology to THA1 for a symbolic sum. This allowed 
the teaching hospital indirectly to buy and have access to the technology, thereby evading the 
law which compels hospitals to have the consent of the government before acquiring a PET 
scanner or expensive technology. Because people in the Foundation were surprised at the 
deficiency of the Quebec health care system in the number of PET scanners, members of the 
board were easily persuaded by Doctor Z that financing this technology made sense. This was 
reinforced by the fact that THB had a PET scanner, while THA1 had none: “Members of the 
foundation were surprised. They wondered: ‘How come region A has no PET scanner and 
region B has one?’ And when everybody says ‘It doesn’t make any sense!’ the legitimacy is 
there, with no questions asked.”  
As a result, by January 2003, THA1 acquired a PET scanner without asking for the 
authorization and even without informing the Ministry of Health. When the story came out in 
the lay press in the same month, the official version stated that the machine was financed by 
research funds and used for research purposes. Interestingly, the media were already 
announcing that privately selling services was an option if the teaching hospital were to lack 
financial resources for operating the machine. Because THA1 could publicly legitimate this 
acquisition by invoking the fact that the machine was for diagnosing a widespread deadly and 
highly publicized condition (cancer), it was unlikely that the Ministry of Health would 
denounce it: 
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 “Put yourself in the shoes of the Minister who comes to tell us: “Whoah! You are going 
to get the machine out of there and you are not going to use it.” That’s a risky business. 
If that went to the media, we would have several very sensible and logical explanations 
to give to the people. The government would look pretty silly. (…) Especially as there are 
so many cancer cases… [the government wouldn’t want to hear us] tell patients, “Well – 
we’re  ready  to offer  you a useful  service, but  the Minister has decided  that  you  can’t 
have it” Politically, you have to be careful.” 
After this adoption, doctors from various hospitals called THA1 for information on how this 
strategic move was carried out: “Five or six doctors called me to know how I had done it. 
How I dealt with the board of directors, the general management staff, and the Foundation, to 
do it, and make it official. They really wanted to know how I had pulled that off.” 
Given that access to health care is a public service in Quebec, doctors cannot, by law, receive 
private payment for health care services which are insured by the universal coverage. Despite 
this rule, THA1 had to find a way to finance the running costs of its PET scanner. The 
solution found was to offer PET scanner services at nights and on week-ends on a private 
basis to private clinics that were willing to pay 2500$. This would give patients or 
organizations access to a PET scanner within three to four days instead of two to six months, 
which corresponds to the normal public waiting time. With the surplus generated from this 
activity, THA1 was able to fund its public activity, and also to charge the Quebec Health 
Insurance Agency for each act publicly performed.  
Fifteen months after the acquisition of the PET scanner, the maneuver which consisted of 
prioritizing private before public patients was reported in the media and provoked a swift 
reaction from deputies at the legislature and from the Minister of Health who asked THA1 to 
stop selling public services to the private sector: “Political actions were taken. After all, we 
are part of a Health System that is socialist. People said: ‘It’s not fair that a public hospital 
with public funding is used for activities tied to the private sector.” This situation had to be 
handled rapidly by the government because the health insurance law forbids organizations 
from the public health care network to be financed through private activities. Moreover, the 
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situation was critical to the point that publicly paid staffs were employed to run the PET 
scanner to generate private revenue. To enable THA1 to stop financing its operation through 
private funds the Minister of Health announced that an operational budget of 1250 cases for 
2004-2005 would be allocated to them. 
Analysis. The struggle between teaching hospital THA1 and the Ministry of Health is the 
expression of, on the one hand, hospitals’ interests in adopting such a prestigious and 
expensive technology and, on the other, the cost-containment imperative of the government. 
Because hospitals need the authorization from the government to acquire this technology, the 
government can use its regulatory power to hinder any adoption by delaying the 
announcement of a dissemination plan. However, wide diffusion in the USA, the confirmation 
of the effectiveness of the technology by the HTAA report, the special status of cancer, which 
is often synonymous to a sentence of death, and patient needs, all contributed to building the 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy of this technology and a strong pressure to adopt. Further, given 
its mission in cancer and in technology assessment, THA1 had an important incentive to 
acquire this technology. This cultural-cognitive legitimacy of the technology and the interest 
of THA1 to adopt advanced technology are two powerful incentives to acquire a PET scanner. 
The legitimacy of the technology was such that it outweighed the legitimacy of the regulation 
which was impeding such adoption. This adoption against the will of the government is a 
form of what we call institution testing, which we define as an action against regulatory 
constraints. 
While institution testing was a strategic move to pre-empt the adoption of the PET scanner, 
other actions in this case can also be considered deviant. For example, the private funding of 
the daily public operation of the PET scanner is questionable as regard to the law. The 
problem stems from the situation where patients willing to pay were jumping the waiting list, 
something the public and the government could not tolerate because it goes against equity of 
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access. Another problem was that publicly paid human resources were used for diagnosing 
private patients. Overall, it is because this technology is aligned with the mission of the 
organization and also because legitimacy of the technology is greater than the legitimacy of 
the regulation that institution testing was possible. 
Interestingly, this behaviour was successful for at least two reasons. While institution testing 
pre-empted the adoption of this technology, it also allowed THA1 to obtain a budget. Indeed, 
when the story of privately funded operations at THA1 came out in the lay press, the 
government reacted to calm the tension by providing an operational budget. In this case, the 
government was literally trapped because it could not hinder access to a cancer diagnosing 
device nor could it sanction a deviant behaviour which was generating inequity in the system 
as other hospitals did not have this technology. Furthermore, the success of this first episode 
of institution testing paved the way for further breaches. 
A Second Deviant Adoption. The director of the Nuclear Medicine Department at teaching 
hospital THA2 had already had the idea to acquire a PET scanner with or without the consent 
of the government. In 2002, with the support of a public personality, he opened a private 
foundation with the purpose of funding a PET-CT scanner. After the acquisition of THA1, 
THA2 met with the private foundation of the hospital to finance part of a PET-CT scanner. 
The new foundation created by the public personality together with the traditional foundation 
of THA2 gathered the amount of money required to acquire a PET-CT scanner. Before 
proceeding with this acquisition, THA2 informed the Health Services Regional Agency, the 
interlocutor of the Ministry of Health, that they were inviting companies to tender for a PET 
scanner. Promptly the Health Services Regional Agency sent a letter to THA2 urging them to 
stop this acquisition process: 
“We told the Health Services Regional Agency that we were offering tenders to acquire 
the equipment. The Agency sent us a  letter telling us  that we could not do  that. There 
were laws at the Ministry level, and they sent us a copy of those laws. They said that only 
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the Minister had  the right  to decide new programs. We could not  invest money  in  this 
project, and so on.” 
Although THA2 did not obtain the authorization to acquire this technology, the adjunct 
director of the hospital decided to move forward with the project. This choice was strategic 
for THA2 as the PET-CT scanner was aligned with its mission and was also a good way to 
compete against general hospital GHA in oncology: 
“It  is  part  of  our  mission.  If  we  want  to  provide  the  best  care  available  for  cancer 
patients, we must acquire  this  equipment.  […]  There  is also  this  competition between 
General  Hospital  GHA  and  teaching  hospital  THA2.  They  both  want  to  dominate  the 
oncology program in region A.”  
The letter from the Health Services Regional Agency was insufficient to stop the movement 
given that adopting the technology was of little risk for THA2 because, as one interviewee 
stated, if the technology had to diffuse, it had to diffuse in a teaching hospital: “Granted, we 
went against the rules, but it was a calculated risk. If a machine was to be deployed in the 
province, it had to be in a teaching hospital first, as there were already two machines at 
teaching hospital THB.” 
Once the hospital infrastructure for the PET scanner was under construction, THA2 asked the 
government for an operational budget, but once again this was a dead letter. To finance its 
operation, THA2 drew on its global budget thereby increasing its deficit. Because generating 
deficit in hospitals was and is still prohibited by the law, this behaviour is rather unexpected. 
While THA2 started operating its PET-CT scanner by May 17th 2004, its budget constraint 
limited the number of patients to undergo examinations to 2 patients / day instead of 12 
patients / day. This precaution was taken to avoid ending up with a huge operational deficit if 
the Ministry of Health would not provide an operational budget. 
Analysis. Again, in this episode institution testing was possible because the legitimacy of the 
technology was greater than the legitimacy of the regulation, and also because the technology 
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was aligned with the mission of THA2. This confirmed that institution testing, a deviant 
adoption in this case, was a relatively low risk behaviour given the mission of the teaching 
hospital in oncology and in technology assessment. Furthermore, THA2 had indications that 
THA1 would get away with purchasing their PET scanner without trouble. Finally, institution 
testing spread to this hospital for competitive reasons also. Indeed, for THA2 to remain a 
reference in oncology, acquiring a PET scanner was necessary. THA2 was deviant not only in 
acquiring the technology, but also in the way it financed its operation. Because the 
government did not allow an operational budget, this hospital drew on its global budget to 
finance its operation despite the risk of deepening its deficit, an offence in the eye of the law 
since 2002 in Quebec. 
A Third Deviant Adoption. In 2003, general hospital GHA was approached by a citizen who 
wished to present the hospital with a major donation for the acquisition of a PET-CT scanner, 
provided that the hospital agreed to buy from a specific private company and within a certain 
timeframe. After having been informed about this unique opportunity, the Health Services 
Regional Agency, under the authority of the Ministry of Health, considered that other 
organizations in the region A would qualify for a PET scanner before this general hospital. 
Under the threat of losing the donation, the general hospital GHA informed the Health 
Services Regional Agency that it was inviting companies to tender for a PET-CT scanner 
despite the opposition of the Ministry of Health. Since the Health Services Regional Agency 
of region A did not want to be held responsible for the general hospital GHA to have lost this 
donation, the Ministry of Health did not respond to this letter: 
“No  one  wants  to  be  the  person  who  will  explain  to  the  media  that  a  benefactor 
cancelled his pledge because we waited too long, and we could not buy the equipment. 
The Health  Services  Regional Agency’s  civil  servant  understood  this  perfectly. He was 
stuck between a rock and a hard place. So he let us proceed with the invitation to tender, 
even if it did not suit him at all.” 
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Although funds were immediately available to acquire a PET-CT scanner, the general hospital 
GHA finally decided to wait for the authorization of the Ministry of Health. After a few 
months, the government came up with a plan of dissemination (see next section) of the PET 
scanner technology in Quebec and since the general hospital GHA was in this plan, the 
government authorized this hospital to acquire a PET scanner. However, the authorization 
was not accompanied by the necessary operational budget. Applying the same strategy as 
teaching hospital THA2, general hospital GHA financed its operations through its global 
budget thereby incurring the risk of increasing its deficit. Nonetheless, since the risk of not 
being reimbursed was quite low, the general hospital GHA started examining patients in 
October 2004, before receiving its operational budget, but using a cautious approach and not 
spending too much on this technology. The government committed itself to pay an operational 
budget to GHA by August 5th, 2005 to cover its costs since the beginning of its operation: 
“At the General Hospital GHA, a generous benefactor has promised to pay the total sum 
for the acquisition of a PET scanner, but the government has given no hint it was willing 
to pay for the annual operating costs of this equipment. The hospital has been waiting 
for a year and a half…” 
- Local newspaper, January 6th, 2005 
Analysis. The desire of general hospital GHA to take advantage of the donation inspired it to 
acquire a PET scanner despite opposition from the Ministry of Health. Hence, institution 
testing is still an issue in this case, although a milder case. The main difference with the two 
previous cases is that general hospital GHA waited for government approval before really 
acquiring it. While it still somehow forced the hand of the government to be on the 
dissemination plan, the status of this general hospital, which is not as prestigious as a teaching 
hospital, and its mission, which is not so centred on evaluating technology, may explain its 
more conservative behaviour as regards to the adoption of this technology. 
Although the donation was an important factor for adoption, competition between hospitals to 
become or to remain a local reference in oncology is clearly the motor that brought the 
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general hospital GHA to acquire a PET-CT scanner. Because general hospital GHA called 
teaching hospital THA1 to know how the latter managed to obtain this technology, mimetic 
isomorphism might be driving not the acquisition per se, but the process of acquiring a 
medical technology. Furthermore, because general hospital GHA does not have the budget to 
run its machine, like THA1, it drew on its global budget to do so. Hence, starting the adoption 
process before having the authorization of the Ministry of Health was a good strategy to pre-
empt the adoption of this technology. Most probably, without deviant action, general hospital 
GHA would have had a PET scanner, but at a later time; and it might not have been the more 
sophisticated PET-CT scanner. 
Concluding the case study. To avoid the chaotic diffusion of PET scanners, the government of 
Quebec had a strong incentive to develop a dissemination plan: “So, I guess government 
decision takers thought they better take charge of this matter and manage it, or else, it would 
manage itself by itself.” The Quebec Association of Nuclear Medicine and the Ministry of 
Health finally reached an agreement as to how to disseminate the PET scanners and a plan 
was created giving priority to those who already had a PET scanner, i.e. those who were 
defending a quality-based diffusion approach. According to the dissemination plan of June 
2005, the PET scanner technology would be disseminated in three phases with an emphasis 
on providing PET-CT scanners to teaching hospitals first or hospitals on the way to acquiring 
one. Thus, adopting a PET scanner without the consent of the government was a good 
strategy. As one interviewee remarks: “The consequence for GHA in adopting a PET scanner 
earlier is that they accelerated their case [at the Ministry of Health]. Maybe they would have 
received their authorization later.” 
DISCUSSION  
Like new industries, new technologies face the liability of newness (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
They have to become legitimate with different groups in order to diffuse and be used. 
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However, contrary to what is assumed in the literature, regulated environment may involve 
that not only the technology itself needs to be legitimated, but also its diffusion. Indeed, our 
case study shows that there are two distinct processes which provide legitimacy to technology 
diffusion: one involving technology testing and the other institution testing. For the case 
analyzed, the first legitimation process was specific to the purpose and the benefits of the 
technology and involved technology testing and the second one concerned its diffusion and 
was characterized by institution testing.  
Legitimation Processes of Technology Diffusion 
The first legitimation process was characterized by framing contests which took place 
between two hospitals in one region where each one attempted to influence the regulator by 
defining the technology according to its own mission and interest (whether as a tool to be 
used in cardiology and lung cancer or as device to be used in oncology). The second 
legitimation process was related to the diffusion of the technology. In the case, the framing 
contests over the diffusion of the technology involved contradictory arguments. Teaching 
hospitals were in favor of creating competence centers with the latest technology and general 
hospitals dispersed across the province of Quebec preferred to have the less expensive version 
of the technology to be regionalized and accessible from different points in the province. Thus, 
in regulated environments, the legitimation processes of technology diffusion involve not only 
the demonstration of the benefits of the technology as is often assumed in the literature, but it 
is also related to who should have the technology or how it should be diffused. Each of these 
processes is subjected to distinct power struggles manifested in different framing contests 
when several competing technological frames are crafted, are contradictory and attempt at 
capturing the same resources. 
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Technology Testing 
The process leading to the legitimacy of the purpose and the benefits of the technology is 
characterized by a high level of ambiguity which was the result of technology framing 
contests. It is the reliance on technology testing that is the evaluation of the technology 
through a legitimate procedure which terminated one framing contest and granted legitimacy 
to the purpose and benefits of the technology. In our case, the technology framing contests 
over the technology (cardiology versus oncology) increased the ambiguity surrounding the 
purpose and the benefits of the technology and led the Quebec Nuclear Medical Association 
to ask for an evaluation of the technology. Because this evaluation was held by an 
independent governmental assessment agency, which has the mission to assess medical 
technologies, the report it produced had the effect of providing legitimacy to the purpose and 
benefits of the technology and in our case put an end to framing contests on this dimension at 
least. Paradoxically, it stopped the framing contests not because it proclaimed a ‘winner’ of 
the contest, but because it recognized the multiple purpose and benefits of the technology; it’s 
not that the technology is for cardiac or oncology applications, it is both. It is the legitimacy 
of the independent governmental assessment agency in this health care system which granted 
legitimacy to the technology through some sort of spillover effects (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) 
from the legitimacy of the procedure it uses (i.e. science) to the legitimacy of the technology. 
Taken together, these results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition  1:  In  regulated  environments,  technology  framing  contests  increase 
ambiguity which may  in  turn  spark  the need  to  rely on  technology  testing  in order  to 
bring a  resolution of  the debate,  to  lower ambiguity and  to provide  legitimacy  to  the 
purpose and benefits of a technology. 
Legitimate procedures such as scientific evaluation may provide normative legitimacy if the 
results of it reflects a positive assessment. While Suchman (1995: 580) argues that adopting 
“accepted techniques or procedures” may confer legitimacy to organization, our case provide 
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evidence that legitimate evaluation procedures based on an institution such as science can 
provide legitimacy to an artifact. Technology testing involves legitimate procedures which 
may provide cognitive-cultural legitimacy to a technology if the evaluation is positive. The 
legitimacy of the procedure seems to produce legitimacy spillover (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) 
from the procedure itself to the technology because there is a cultural consensus on the 
method used to assess the artifact. 
The literature which conceptualizes the development of technology from the perspective of 
the developers and the manufacturers use the term evaluation routines to take into account the 
practices which test technologies (Garud & Rappa, 1994). Evaluation routines use equipment 
to produce facts or evidence which serve to assess the technology (Latour, 1987) and it is a 
normative activity which is often part of a ‘tradition of technological testability’ (Constant, 
1987). While developers externalize their beliefs through their personal evaluation routines, 
our cases suggest that users and regulators may also rely on assessment not to evaluate its 
potential to be further developed, but to check to what extend a technology fits cultural 
requirements and expectations.  Our data confirm the imminent role of technology testing in 
legitimating the purpose and benefits of technology, and may also confer legitimacy to how 
the technology should be diffused as long as this issue is not contested. In other words, when 
a test is conducted and the results are positive because they fit cultural expectations, it confers 
legitimacy to the technology. Consequently, it can be expected that this technology will be 
more extensively used as it will be  considered as valuable in a given field (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006). Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) would argue that when the result of a test is 
positive i.e. successful, a technology has increased its “state of worth” i.e. its value or 
legitimacy in a given World. 
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Institution Testing 
This legitimacy which was derived from the Health Technology Assessment Agency report 
gave rise to another round of framing contests where the way the technology should be 
implemented in the system was at stake. With the regulator not making decision and with a 
technology which is legitimated by formal technology testing, it opened the door for 
organizations with sufficient political clout and financial resources to adopt the technology 
preemptively without government consent, what we call institution testing. This occurred 
when facing apparently irresolvable framing contests, actors relied on institution testing that 
is a strategic behavior which terminates framing contests when the cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy of a technology is stronger than regulatory legitimacy. In our case, the framing 
contests related to the way the technology should be implemented in the health care system i.e. 
highly dispersed versus concentrated throughout the province of Quebec generated a lot of 
tension and ambiguity which led the regulator to postpone any decision related to the adoption 
of the PET scanner. This generated frustration among doctors and hospitals and they began 
adopting the PET scanner despite the law which forbade this type of behavior. Because 
hospitals adopted without the consent of the regulator, the latter had to elaborate a plan which 
stated which hospitals should have a PET scanner. Interestingly, those who used institution 
testing, i.e. tested the regulator, were included in the plan thereby legitimizing the forced 
implementation of the technology by hospitals. This suggests that institution testing was a 
behavior which not only pre-empted the diffusion of the technology, but which also 
established the legitimacy of the diffusion of the technology, terminated the related framing 
contests and lowered ambiguity. These results suggest the following:  
Proposition  2:  When  framing  contests  over  diffusion  cannot  be  resolved  through 
legitimated means,  institution  testing may  come  into  play.  It  is  a  strategic  behaviour 
available to the most powerful actors in a given field which may resolve framing contest 
by pre‐empting  the diffusion of a  technology  in highly  regulated environments. This  is 
likely  to  occur  when  the  cultural‐cognitive  legitimacy  of  a  technology  have  acquired 
sufficient force to trump regulatory legitimacy. 
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In their model of institutional change, Greenwood et al. (2002) theorizes that the legitimacy of 
an innovation would evolve from moral and/or pragmatic legitimacy to cognitive legitimacy 
which corresponds to the institutionalization of an innovation. While this study argues that 
there seems to have been a sequence related to the way legitimacy unfolds in time, little 
research examines how different legitimacies influence each other or may clash.  
What constitutes an institutional test in our study is the challenge made to the regulator by the 
hospitals which affected the decision of disseminating this technology with prudence, while 
the hospitals wanted it rapidly. Boltanski and Thévenot (2005) would argue that when actors 
perceive that there is an injustice between the “state of worth” and the current positions 
occupied by technological artifacts or people in a given field, a test can be mobilized or used 
to evaluate if there is an injustice in the current situation. The test in that case involves 
different principles such as imperative of cost control by the government and the efficiency of 
diffusing the PET scanner. It is because of the incompatibility of these two principles that the 
regulator was tested, i.e. challenged, by adopting the technology without its consent. The 
result of this challenge suggests that the test favored the challenger of the status quo.  
Contrary to the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) or institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 
2002) which assumes that agents are purposeful and conscious agents which deliberately 
attempt to push for non-isomorphic institutional change, little work has documented 
unintended institutional change. Actors in our case studies were interested in obtaining and 
legitimizing the PET scanner, not changing institutions. However, institution testing led to the 
adjustment of rules to accommodate those who behaved against the will of the regulator. This 
conferred to the technology the legitimacy over the way it should be diffused. In a sense, this 
is remarkably similar to the story of the Little Prince where the king commands to the sun to 
rise every morning. In the same manner, our case studies document how the regulators 
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followed those who pushed for opening up the path to technology diffusion because the 
technology had sufficient legitimacy to outweigh the law.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have shown that the legitimation processes of technology diffusion in 
regulated environments is subjected to distinct power struggles manifested in different 
framing contests when several competing technological frames are crafted, are contradictory 
and attempt at capturing the same resources. We show that technology framing contests 
increase ambiguity which may in turn spark the need to rely on technology testing in order to 
bring a resolution of the debate, to lower ambiguity and to provide legitimacy to the purpose 
and benefits of a technology. Furthermore, we show that when framing contests over 
diffusion cannot be resolved through legitimated means, institution testing may come into 
play. This is a strategic behaviour available to the most powerful actors in a given field which 
may resolve framing contests by pre-empting the diffusion of a technology against regulatory 
constraints. This is likely to occur when the cultural-cognitive legitimacy of a technology has 
acquired sufficient force to trump regulatory legitimacy. Finally, building on evidence from 
our research, we develop a processual model which links framing contests, testing and the 
legitimacy of technology diffusion.  
Note that our model applies specifically to situations where organizations are competing to 
influence the meaning and the diffusion process of an artifact when there are scarce resources 
and when institutions impede the legitimation process. The adoption of high technology 
within regulated health care systems is a particularly likely context for such phenomena. 
However, they may also occur for other products and in a broader institutional framework. 
For example, in the case of dextran sulphate to fight aids, there was a framing contest in the 
lay and medical press where some doctors claimed that the compound was ineffective while 
others believed in was effective. Here, pharmaceutical companies engaged in technology 
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testing to produce evidence. At the institutional level, the gay community was involved in 
institution testing when they illegally imported the drug from outside the USA (Maguire, 
2002) despite prohibition from the Californian authorities. Like in the case of the PET scanner, 
the ambiguity was related to the effectiveness of the drug.   
Another example is the case of the genetically modified rice in Ireland. While the European 
Union has explicit legislation which states that genetically modified product must pass an 
authorization procedure before being commercialized, genetically modified rice was found in 
the European market without receiving such authorization. While OGM-free NGOs and rice 
producers were framing this product as potentially dangerous, the producers of the rice were 
framing it as risk-free (Food_Standards_Agency, 2006). The legalization of marijuana in 
USA for medical use is also a case where many recreational users were illegally consuming it 
despite the lack of evidence about the long term effect of the drug. Research has finally found 
that this drug was effective for relieving patients having cancer. Other new technologies such 
as medical devices, drugs, genetically modified food, pesticides, nanotechnologies, or 
biological technology such as cloning may be subjected to the same legitimation processes. 
This suggests that adopting technology despite institutional pressure may contribution not 
only to legitimize a given technology, but also its diffusion. 
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